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Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from 
1881 to the Present 
HEATHER]. SHARKEY 
The first jihad of modern Sudanese history began in 1881, when a northern Suda- / 
nese Muslim scholar named Muhammad Ahmad (1844-1885) declared himself to 
be al-Mahdi-"the Rightly Guided One"-who would restore justice in an age of 
chaos before the Day of Judgment. Muhammad Ahmad, the Mahdi, then declared 
jihad against the Turco-Egyptian regime that had been ruling the region since 
Muhammad 'Ali, the Ottoman governor of Egypt, had ordered a conquest in 
1820.1 Tapping into popular Muslim millenarian beliefs and into widespread 
grievances against this regime, the Mahdi amassed followers, who defeated Turco-
Egyptian forces in a series of battles. The regime collapsed in 1885, when Mahdist 
armies overtook the colonial capital, Khartoum, and killed Charles Gordon, the 
British military careerist and devout Christian whom authorities had appointed 
as governor-general. Gordon's death, in turn, galvanized evangelical Christians in 
Britain and helped to fuel a burgeoning movement among Protestant mission-
aries who were adopting the militant rhetoric of the British government in its age 
of "New Imperialism.''2 Some of these missionaries indeed described their evange-
lism as a modern crusade. 3 
The Mahdi died from a sudden illness shortly after the fall of Khartoum in 1885, 
so the task of organizing the Mahdist state fell to his successor, known as al-Khalifa 
Abdullahi (r. 1885-1898) or simply the Khalifa.4 Meanwhile, British authorities 
eyed Sudan from the distance of Egypt, which Britain had occupied in 1882. 
Drawing on British popular support for retaliation against the Mahdists and 
responding to the "Scramble for Africa," Britain launched a "Reconquest" of Sudan 
in 1898 while using new technologies such as railways and Maxim guns to crush 
Mahdist armies. After contriving a government known as the Anglo-Egyptian Con-
dominium (which reflected an ostensible partnership with Egypt), Britain went on 
to rule Sudan until1956. Throughout the Anglo-Egyptian period, British fears of 
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Muslim "fanaticism" influenced colonial policies toward education, administration, 
and public health, while arguably also shaping assumptions about Islam among 
members of the Christian (Protestant and Catholic) missions that streamed into 
the country on the heels of the colonial conquest. 
At decolonization in the mid-1950s, Britain passed control of Sudan-by then 
consisting of a territory far larger and more culturally diverse than anything the 
Turco-Egyptians or Mahdists had ruled-to a small group of highly educated and 
socially elite Muslim Arabic-speaking nationalists, many of whom were sons and 
grandsons of the Mahdi's supporters. In 1955 (just months before formal inde-
pendence), concerns about the transfer of power set off a conflict that many his-
torians retrospectively called the "first civil war" (1955-1972), in relation to what 
became known as the "second civil war" (1983-c. 2005). Meanwhile, in 1958, fol-
lowing a brief period of parliamentary rule in which factions followed Muslim 
sectarian lines, a military junta seized power in a coup d'etat. Military-backed 
regimes went on to rule Sudan for most of the half-century that followed. At the 
same time, postcolonial conflicts variously simmered and boiled, with "rebels" in 
Sudan's southern, western, and eastern peripheries resisting the policies of the 
Khartoum regimes. So complex, long-running, and geographically diffuse were 
Sudan's civil conflicts that one historian later argued convincingly for a plurality 
of Sudanese "civil wars."5 
Sudan's civil conflicts have been complex and multifaceted. Yet in the postcolo-
nial period, foreign media often portrayed them simplistically, as a single war 
between a Muslim Arab North and a Christian African South. This portrayal was 
misleading insofar as it emphasized a kind of religious and ethnic or racial antip-
athy while minimizing the battles over power and resources that lay at the root of 
the conflict. Meanwhile, jihadist rhetoric periodically surfaced amid the fighting. 
Successive regimes in Khartoum, though most notably the ideologically Islamist 
regime of 'Umar al-Bashir (r. 1989-present), invoked jihadist discourses to justify 
central-government attacks on dissidents in the country's peripheries. 
If one thing stands out from this history, it is that jihads and crusades have 
been self-constitutive acts.6 They have been more about affirming or defining the 
self than about striking at enemies. They have entailed assertions of power and 
sometimes calls for change, both between and within religious communities. Nei-
ther Muslims and Christians within Sudan nor observers outside the country ap-
pear to have appreciated fully these aspects of the "holy" wars of modern Sudan. 
Jihad! Anti-Christian Sentiment1 
and the Mahdist Revolution 
Contrary to the insinuations oflate-Victorian-era British writers, the anti-Christian 
dimension of the Mahdist jihad was minimal. When Na'um Shuqayr, a Syro-Leba-
nese official in the Intelligence Department of the Anglo-Egyptian regime, published 
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Jughra{iyya wa tarikh al-Sudan (an Arabic survey of Sudanese history, culture, and 
geography) in 1903, he listed the factors that had inspired the Mahdist movement 
and its call to arms. Above all, Sudanese Muslims resented the Turco-Egyptian 
regime's oppressive and mounting taxation, its efforts to restrict the slave trade 
(which Sudanese Muslims regarded as part of the Islamic social order and on which 
many relied for agricultural labor), its crushing of early dissidents, and its favoritism 
toward particular groups. 7 Economic distress among small-scale farmers and traders, 
along with dislocations caused by government monopoly systems and the introduc-
tion of cash currencies, also contributed to dissatisfaction.8 Still others objected to 
what they perceived as the irreligiosity and debauchery of Turco-Egyptian (Muslim) 
administrators. For example, one writer claimed in 1901, twenty years after the 
start of the Mahdist revolution, that "Muhammad Ahmad [al-Mahdi] was among 
the group of religious notables in al-Obeid who were outraged by a marriage cere-
mony between a man and a young boy, but when they protested to the local Egyptian 
official they received insulting treatment."9 
It made matters worse, in the eyes of Sudanese Muslims, that in the 1870s, the 
Turco-Egyptian administration had begun appointing European Christian (and 
Jewish)10 officers to positions of importance.U This policy marked a sharp depar-
ture from conventions of Islamic statecraft, which had barred Christians and 
Jews from bearing arms in Muslim societies.U The Turco-Egyptians appointed 
men such as the Briton Charles Gordon, first as governor of Equatoria province 
and later as governor-general of the whole territoryY In Equatoria alone, Gor-
don's staff included "two Americans, an Italian, a Frenchman, and three (later 
five) Englishmen."14 Elsewhere in Sudan, the Turco-Egyptians appointed several 
Americans who had fought for Confederate forces during the American Civil War 
and who found themselves unemployed afterwardY Sudanese Muslims regarded 
these appointments as further evidence of the mismanagement of the Turco-
Egyptian regime. 
There is no evidence that the Mahdi had grievances about Charles Gordon in 
particular or that he even knew much about him. And in fact, Gordon appears to 
have done a good job as a Sudan administrator. According to one historian, when 
Gordon was serving as the Turco-Egyptian governor-general from 1877 to 1880, 
he reversed long-standing Turco-Egyptian policies that had marginalized Suda-
nese Sufi leaders, adopted a more tolerant attitude toward Sudanese Islam, and 
included more Sudanese Muslims in his administration. Symbolically, in an effort 
to make the Turco-Egyptian government more responsive, Gordon even affixed a 
suggestion and complaint box to the gates of his palace in Khartoum so that the 
people could express their concerns.16 
Nevertheless, the appearance of non-Muslims in the Turco-Egyptian regime 
during the 1870s disturbed Sudanese Muslims insofar as through these men, the 
acceleration of Western imperialism was becoming visible. By the time Muham-
mad Ahmad declared himself Mahdi in 1881, fifty-one years had passed since the 
French invasion and conquest of Algeria, while just six years had passed since an 
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Anglo-French banking consortium had seized control of Ottoman and Egyptian 
finances and public debts. A mere four years had passed since Queen Victoria had 
declared herself empress of India. Meanwhile, Britain was intent on safeguarding 
the Suez Canal (opened to traffic in 1869) along with maritime routes to India. 
European powers were calling the Ottoman empire "the Sick Man of Europe," and 
the empire was certainly struggling to hold on to its fringes: Greece had been 
independent since the 1820s, while other Christian populations (such as the 
Armenians) were becoming more restive. Disquieting news from Muslim traders 
and pilgrims crossing the Sahara, traversing the Nile Valley or the Red Sea cor-
ridor, and returning from Mecca contributed to the flow of information into 
Sudan on all of these aspects of European expansion. Such news added to the 
sense of anxiety and malaise that made Sudan a ripe field for millenarianismP 
Even the war that the Mahdists began with Christian Abyssinia (Ethiopia) does 
not support the idea that the Mahdist jihad was explicitly anti-Christian. To be 
sure, in 1889, when the Mahdists fired a volley that killed Yohannes IV, the Abys-
sinian emperor, on the battlefield, the Khalifa Abdullahi hailed the emperor's 
death as a great victory for Islam against Christianity. Yet the Mahdist victory 
against Abyssinia had practical purposes that transcended ideology: it drew more 
firmly what had been until then a shaky Sudanese-Ethiopian border while main-
taining commercial exchanges and did so at a time when the Mahdists were trying 
to assert the bounds of their territory vis-a-vis "Muslim" Egypt.18 Indeed, the 
Mahdists called all of their opponents infidels (kuffar), both Muslims (such as the 
Turco-Egyptian authorities) and Christians. Invoking jihad against "infidels" jus-
tified the seizure of booty and helped to build up the Mahdist treasury at a time 
when the Mahdist state was increasingly isolated, restricted in trade, and des-
perate for income.19 
Watching from the distance of Mecca as the Mahdist revolution unfolded, a 
Shafi'i Muslim scholar named Ahmad Zayni Dahlan (d. 1886)-a man who was 
neither Sudanese nor a believer in the Mahdi-voiced support for its battles. Dab-
Ian expressed hope that the Mahdi and his supporters would strike Western, 
Christian forces that were beginning to exert themselves in the region and thereby 
help to bolster the Ottoman empire. But Dahlan was misinformed about the 
movement.20 Opposition to an incipient Western imperialism was one source of 
Mahdist activism but only one: at least in the early years of the movement (1881-
85), opposition to Turco-Egyptian imperialism was far more important in trig-
gering and sustaining jihad. 
The Nature, Goals, and Impact of the MahdistJihad 
The overarching goal of the Mahdist movement was to reform Islam from within, 
by purging popular customs and practices deemed "un-Islamic," and to establish 
an Islamic government. In this regard, the Sudanese Mahdist movement belonged 
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to a series of reformist jihad movements that swept through Islamic Africa during 
the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.21 Like the earlier jihads of 'Uthman 
dan Fodio and 'Umar Tall in West Africa (discussed by David Robinson in chapter 
12 above), the Mahdi's jihad largely entailed a battle among Muslims over the di-
rection that Muslim culture and statecraft should take. It also had a strong na-
tivist dimension, insofar as it emphasized the primacy of local Muslim rule. 
Sudanese Islam had been evolving for centuries and, like religious cultures 
everywhere, was a work in progress. Arab Muslim conquerors had reached Nubia, 
roughly along the present-day Sudanese-Egyptian border, as early as 651-the 
same year when Arab Muslim armies overthrew the last Sassanian shah of Iran. 
But compared with Islam in Iran, Islam in Sudan took centuries longer to spread. 
Christianity persisted in Nubia until the early fourteenth century, that is, until 
around 1315, when the first Muslim seized the Nubian throne. 22 Two centuries 
later, around 1500, a Muslim sultanate known as the Funj emerged near the 
junction of the White and Blue Niles, followed shortly thereafter, around 1600, by 
another sultanate, led by the Kayra dynasty, in Darfur to the west. The emergence 
of these two Mus lim states helped to foster what historians have described as the 
consolidation of Sudanese Muslim culture. During the Funj era, this Muslim cul-
ture centered on Sufi holy men, who often functiol).ed as amulet writers, healers, 
fortune-tellers, and even rainmakers. 23 The Funj and Kayra sultanates also pro-
vided the kind of political stability that enabled new Muslim pilgrimage and trade 
routes to flourish. Instead of crossing the Sahara to North Africa's Mediterranean 
coast and from there heading by sea to Arabia, West African pilgrims began taking 
a route across the interior Sudanic belt of Africa, which brought them past Lake 
Chad through Sudan to its Red Sea port at Suakin, which was just two hundred 
miles from Jiddah.24 Indeed, West African pilgrims from the Sokoto caliphate 
probably transmitted the millenarian ideas and Mahdist expectations that caught 
on in Sudan. 25 
The reforms that developed out of the Mahdist jihad emphasized the more rig-
orous implementation of Islamic law, practice, and administration. Important ev-
idence for this change appears in the proclamations (manshurat), fatwas, letters, 
and warnings (indharat) that the Mahdi (and to some extent the Khalifa) issued in 
writing. The Mahdi and Khalifa used these texts to justify their leadership, an-
nounce appointments, or make stipulations for the functioning of the military, 
treasury, and other branches of government. Several of the Mahdi's proclama-
tions also set social guidelines. For example, he issued orders about marriage and 
divorce (including limits on dowries and bride wealth), musical performance (for 
example, by forbidding the use of certain instruments but allowing, within limits, 
the use of copper drums), and social infractions (by specifying punishments for 
offenses as minor as swearing, for example, by calling a fellow Muslim believer 
[akh mu'min] a "dog," a "pig," or a "Jew," with the first two of these slurs also con-
noting a Jew or a Christian).26 Given the Mahdist state's attempts to pronounce 
and enforce matters of Islamic law governing the details of everyday life, it is no 
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accident that some observers of contemporary Sudan have drawn parallels 
between the Mahdist state and Sudan's post-1989 regime, the government of 
General BashirY The latter touted its Muslim credentials and commitment to 
Islamic law, while enforcing rules on mundane behavior, for example, by forbid-
ding women from wearing trousers and requiring them to wear a particular style 
of hijab that covered more hair than the sari-like tobe (thawb) had conventionally 
done.28 
The Mahdist jihad also entailed an internal war for Muslim authority and lead-
ership and posed a direct threat to local Sufi orders (tariqas) that had developed 
clear structures of power. 29 Thus, the staunchest opponents of the Mahdi were the 
Sudanese Muslim Sufi leaders, who refused to offer fealty (bay'a). Among these 
were members of the Mirghani family, leaders of the Khatmiyya Sufi tariqa, who 
had close ties to Egypt and the Hijaz and who were interested in the kind of Mus-
lim reform that some scholars have described as "neo-Sufism."30 
Tribal and regional differences, along with economic rivalries, also came into 
play, complicating the Mahdist movement's internal politics. Divisions were vis-
ible within the ranks of Mahdist supporters, notably between the awlad al-balad 
families of the riverine north (some of whom were relatives of the Mahdi) and the 
Baqqara Arab nomads of western Sudan (some of whom were relatives of the 
Khalifa). The Mahdi and the Khalifa pursued two strategies to curb their enemies 
and to stifle dissent. First, the Mahdi declared Sufi tariqas null and void (though 
this had limited effect, and indeed Sufi organizations persisted and later 
rebounded). The Mahdi also established specific rituals for devotion, notably by 
promoting an authoritative prayer book (ratib), that made Mahdist practice some-
what distinct from other Sufi tariqas. 31 Second, the Khalifa tried to erase tribal 
differences through policies of forced migration (tahjir), urban resettlement (in 
the new capital, Omdurman), and intermarriage.32 
In the late twentieth century, Sudanese historians were still debating the suc-
cess of the latter policies. Some argued that the Khalifa's policies successfully gen-
erated unity through amalgamation and muted tribal consciousness. Others 
maintained that his policies left Sudanese Muslim communities more divided and 
more mutually hostile than ever and that they helped to foster a culture of Mus-
lim sectarianism.33 Certainly, the Khalifa's occasional use of brutal collective pun-
ishments signaled his own continuing recognition of clans and tribes, rather than 
individuals, as social units.31 
In an age when literacy rates were minimal and when movable-type printing 
and railways had not yet reached the country, how did the Mahdi and the Khalifa 
spread their messages of jihad and reform at the grassroots to rally popular sup-
port?35 It appears that panegyric poetry, recited and sung, was the Mahdist move-
ment's mass medium.36 The Mahdi and the Khalifa sponsored panegyrists, and 
while a few wrote their compositions down, most appear to have recorded them in 
their own heads. 37 Some of these praise poets passed their Mahdist compositions 
down to sons and grandsons, whose continuing commitment to Mahdist faith 
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arguably represented its own form of Sufi "tariqa loyalty."38 In the mid-twentieth 
century, a Sudanese scholar named Qurashi Muhammad Hasan interviewed the 
grandsons of Mahdist praise poets and recorded their compositions. Qurashi 
Muhammad Hasan later suggested that Mahdist praise poetry in the 1880s had 
entailed a "jihad of the pen" and that it had been just as important as the "jihad of 
the sword" in accomplishing revolution.39 He recognized, in other words, that the 
Mahdist jihad had had a strong rhetorical dimension. 
After Jihad: The British in Sudan 
In 1898, a joint British-Egyptian army overthrew the Mahdist state. At the battle 
of Karari just outside Omdurman, eleven thousand Sudanese Mahdist soldiers 
died, and sixteen thousand were wounded, compared with just 49 dead and 382 
wounded among the Anglo-Egyptian forces. In The River War, Winston Churchill, 
who had been a young war correspondent covering the invasion, noted the tech-
nological supremacy of British weapons and called the battle of Karari "the most 
signal triumph ever gained by the arms of science over barbarians."·
10 However, it 
took nearly a year for Anglo-Egyptian soldiers to catch up with the Khalifa Abdul-
lahi, who had retreated. Later, British sources publicized a photograph of his 
corpse, which was splayed on the prayer mat where soldiers had killed himY In 
1932, one writer called the Khalifa's death "the end of Mahdism," but history was 
already proving that claim wrong. After 1898, Mahdist faith persisted among 
humble families that had supported the movement, while in the years following 
World War I, some sons and grandsons of the Mahdist elite came to lead a main-
stream political movement that sought to negotiate Sudanese independence from 
Britain and Egypt. Often called neo-Mahdism, this twentieth-century movement 
became a central player in Anglo-Egyptian-era nationalist activities and in postco-
lonial Sudanese politics. 
Initially, after 1898, British authorities pursued a strategy of quarantine vis-a-
vis the surviving family members of the Mahdi, the Khalifa, and their emirs 
(leading military commanders). They exiled many sons of these Mahdist elites 
into a kind of prison-cum-house arrest in Egypt and kept the two surviving sons 
of the Mahdi under close watch in Khartoum.42 But within a few years, they were 
revising their policy, by providing the sons of Mahdist elites (including sons of the 
Khalifa) with modern educations and hiring them into the Anglo-Egyptian colo-
nial bureaucracy as agricultural inspectors, civil engineers, district officials, and 
the like. The policy of co-opting elites had already served Britain well in India, and 
it became highly effective in Sudan, too.43 
The greatest fear of British officials in Sudan was that they might do something 
to stimulate Muslim "fanaticism" and to provoke a new jihad. So they took special 
pains to cultivate Muslim elites, particularly those, such as members of the 
Mirghani family, that had resisted the Mahdist movement. Meanwhile, British 
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authorities set out to cultivate a new quiescent class of ulema who could keep a 
system of Islamic law courts running. Worried that al-Azhar, in Egypt, would 
introduce Sudanese students to Egyptian-style, anti-British nationalism, the au-
thorities founded in 1912 a new Sudanese institute for Islamic education, called 
al-Ma'had al-'Ilmi, in Omdurman. At the same time, at Gordon College in Khar-
toum (named in honor of General Charles Gordon and founded in 1902), British 
authorities trained some elite Muslim boys for a future as moderate qadis (while 
training others as accountants, schoolteachers, and the like).44 
World War I prompted the British to accelerate their efforts at co-opting elites. 
When the Ottoman government of the Young Turks sided with Germany and 
declared the war against the Entente powers to be a jihad, Britain feared that 
Muslims throughout the British empire would rise up in waves of resistance. Brit-
ish fears were compounded when leaders of the Sanusiyya movement in Libya 
staged an attack on Egypt's western flank in 1915-16 and when 'Ali Dinar, sultan 
of the quasi-autonomous region of Darfur, sensed an opportunity and declared 
jihad against the British in 1916 (prompting British authorities in Sudan to 
invade, conquer, and annex Darfur in return).45 
Rather than confirming fears of widespread Muslim hostility, World War I pro-
vided an opportunity for Britain to cultivate new alliances with powerful Muslim 
individuals and groups. Britain countered the Ottoman invocation of jihad, most 
famously, by wooing Sharif Husayn of Mecca and orchestrating the Arab Revolt 
from the Hijaz to Syria. In Sudan, the British made new overtures to Sayyid 'Abd 
al-Rahman al-Mahdi (1885-1959), the posthumous son of the Mahdi, who agreed 
to declare support for Britain and its allies. In return, as a demonstration of their 
goodwill, the British enabled Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman to build up large cotton plan-
tations in the budding Gezira Scheme, with some officials calculating that by 
making him rich, they might also make him complacent. Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman 
used the opportunities wisely and benefited from the free farm labor of the Mah-
dist faithful who settled on his land and paid him alms in return for his baraka 
(blessings). In fact, many of his faithful laborers were "Fellata," or Hausa-speaking 
immigrants from northern Nigeria, who headed toward Sudan with the goal of 
fulfilling millenarian expectations, performing the pilgrimage to Mecca, and 
finding economic opportunities.46 
By the time World War I ended, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman al-Mahdi was beginning 
to sponsor early nationalist activities among young elite literati. One of his most 
important ventures was funding Hadarat al-Sudan, a weekly newspaper started in 
1919. This newspaper consciously supported "modernization" programs such as 
the extension of piped water systems in Omdurman and the opening of new 
schools, but it also took two approaches that reflected the evolution of a Mahdist 
worldview. First, it attacked "un-Islamic" or superstitious customs and called for 
their reform through education. Second, it supported the idea of Sudanese inde-
pendence from both Britain and Egypt and became associated with the nationalist 
slogan of "Sudan for the Sudanese" (Sudan li al-Sudaniyyin)Y 
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Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman was charismatic, politically astute, and unflaggingly 
hospitable to British guests; he also proved skillful at organizing the Ansar (fol-
lowers of the Mahdi) behind him while insisting to the British that his intentions 
were peaceful. By some accounts, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman transformed the Mah-
dist movement into a twentieth-century Sufi organization; certainly, the Ansar 
contributed to a political and social landscape of Muslim sectarianism.48 Before 
and after World War I, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman also voiced steadfast support for 
the Anglo-Egyptian government in the face of a series of rural protests that 
evoked the Mahdi. These protests were called Nabi 'Isa (Prophet Jesus) move-
ments, because their leaders claimed to be 'Isa, or Jesus, returning after the Mahdi 
but just before the Day of Judgment in the face of the "Antichrist" (al-Dajjal), 
which they interpreted to mean the British government. In the words of one his-
torian, "With the exception of the war years, hardly a year passed during the first 
generation of Condominium rule without a Mahdist rising" or Nabi 'Isa move-
ment, and yet these rural uprisings failed to rally much support.49 These revolts, 
which were the closest the British came to facing the popular jihad that they 
feared, proved to be very local and easily suppressed. 
Colonial Crusades? 
Did jihadist discourses in modern Sudan inspire reciprocal colonial crusades? Ber-
nard Lewis has argued that the late-nineteenth-century translation of European 
history books into Arabic inspired new Muslim interest in the Crusades (c. 1096-
1271) and thereby kindled an oppositional interest in jihads. 5° However, within 
the specific local context of Sudan, it may be possible to argue the reverse, namely 
that the assertion of Muslim holy war discourses within the Mahdist movement 
encouraged the articulation of Christian equivalents, particularly within British 
missionary circles. 
Certainly, in the 1880s, around the time Britain occupied Egypt, British and, to 
some extent, American evangelicals were beginning to place a strong emphasis on 
the evangelization of Muslims worldwide, from Morocco to Southeast Asia. In this 
period, British missionaries were adopting the kind of strong-arm rhetoric that mir-
rored the aggressive language of British imperialism, while in Britain itself, popular 
imperialism and popular nationalism both maintained strong evangelical Protestant 
dimensions. 51 In responses to the Mahdist revolution, missionaries adopted partic-
ularly strident tones and did so at a time when some were envisioning a contest for 
souls between Islam and Christianity. By 1898, British and American missionaries 
were cheering on the advance of Anglo-Egyptian forces into Mahdist Sudan, while 
British missionaries of the Church Missionary Society (CMS) expressed a desire to 
evangelize Muslims as a way of avenging the death of Charles Gordon many years 
earlier.52 In sum, although British colonial authorities never declared an official 
crusade in the manner that the Mahdi declared a jihad, some Britons in Sudan, 
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particularly missionaries of the CMS, freely invoked crusader discourses at the turn 
of the century. They did so, in large part, to rally support among evangelical Chris-
tians in the home churches who provided missions with the bulk of their funding. 
Perhaps it was an awareness of this militant Christian rhetoric that prompted 
anthropologist Janice Boddy to argue that British policies in Sudan after 1898 
amounted to a series of "colonial crusades." Boddy attributes a spirit of crusader-
ism not only to Christian missionaries but also to all British colonial functionaries 
in Sudan and suggests that Christian agendas shaped the regime. She argues that 
British efforts began with a crusade against Mahdism and evolved in the early 
twentieth century into crusades against Sudanese customs, among them the 
widespread practice of female genital cutting. Equating Christianity with civiliza-
tion, British officials in Sudan fancied themselves as "knight-administrators," 
Boddy contends. They engaged in a struggle that amounted to a "clash of moral-
ities" and deployed workers, such as government educators and midwives, as if 
they were "secular missionaries."53 Boddy's arguments are too sweeping, however, 
insofar as they ignore the divergent views and mixed motives of British protago-
nists in Sudan. 
In fact, high-ranking British colonial authorities, including Lord Cromer and 
Sir Francis Wingate, regarded Christian missionaries as a nuisance and believed 
that their evangelical agendas toward Muslims would stimulate popular resis-
tance. Thus, they were often lukewarm or skeptical toward missionary claims, 
even if deference to domestic British opinion inhibited them from airing their 
views in public. 54 In the end, British officials after the Reconquest officially forbade 
Christian missionaries to proselytize among Sudanese Muslims. They allowed 
them to remain in northern towns with the understanding that they would either 
cater to Christian expatriates (notably Copts, Greeks, and Ethiopians) or provide 
social services to Muslims without trying to convert them.55 CMS missionaries 
resented this curtailment and did their best to evade it on the ground in Sudan. 
Meanwhile, as early as 1910, at the World Missionary Conference in Edinburgh, 
their supporters criticized British policies toward missionaries in Sudan and in 
northern Nigeria. 56 CMS missionaries in the Nile Valley were also annoyed that 
British officials approved only the teaching of Islam at Gordon College and that 
they approved the use of "grammar books [that] deny the Christian faith."57 
However, British authorities such as Wingate had other plans for Christian 
missionaries. They diverted them south, pointing to wide-open fields of endeavor, 
and "urged a mission to the Pagans.''58 Through another neat maneuver, British 
authorities managed to get missionaries to shoulder costs and responsibilities for 
providing southern Sudanese peoples with some schooling. 59 At the same time, in 
remote and thinly governed areas of southern Sudan, British officials were able to 
use missionaries as proxies and relied on them for training southern Sudanese 
men for employment as government clerks. 
Missionaries were already describing southern Sudanese conversion to Chris-
tianity as a "mass movement" in 1932, with one CMS missionary recalling how at 
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Yei, "Huge crowds surged round the car demanding books, baptism, confirmation 
and more teachers.''60 Yet even in the south, British officials occasionally found 
missionaries to be a nuisance. Around 1938, they deported one CMS missionary, 
Richard Jones, who held very fiery revival meetings where he urged sinners and 
backsliders to repent. British officials apparently deemed his style too inflamma-
tory, but some southern Sudanese borrowed and adapted this 'Jones Revival" 
style, with its ecstatic worship and faith healing, so that its impact persisted for 
years afterward. 61 
Relative to the total southern Sudanese population, Christian conversions ap-
pear to have been demographically minute during the colonial period. Neverthe-
less, the southern Sudanese products of mission schools became political organizers 
when civil conflict broke out in 1955, after an army mutiny at Torit, months before 
Britain staged its official ritual of decolonization by lowering the Union Jack in 
Khartoum. Mission converts also functioned as the nucleus of a Christian commu-
nity that expanded dramatically in the late twentieth century, leading some to 
argue in the 1990s that Christianity in war-torn southern Sudan had indeed 
become a mass movement and a vehicle for collective resistance.
62 
During the Anglo-Egyptian period in northern Sudan, British missionaries had 
persisted in evangelizing among Muslims, covertly and as opportunities arose, 
notwithstanding the colonial government ban. By 1956, the CMS northern Sudan 
mission claimed to have "won" just one convert from Islam in its half-century of 
work in the region.63 Yet its mission still made an impact, in social if not religious 
terms, by providing models for the earliest formal girls' schools in northern 
Sudan, including some schools that welcomed girls of slave origins.
6
·
1 
Occasionally during the interwar period, rumors surfaced suggesting that mis-
sionaries may have converted orphan Muslim children to Christianity. Such 
stories galvanized northern Sudanese Muslims in three ways. First, Sudanese 
Muslims began by the 1920s to establish independent, community-supported 
popular (ahliyya) schools as an alternative to Christian mission schools (since 
British government schools were very limited in number and often restricted to 
Muslim elites). Second, Sudanese Muslim women began to establish neighbor-
hood "Needlework Homes," where girls could learn the art of homemaking before 
getting married. One Sudanese writer also claimed that opposition to Christian 
mission education prompted Muslim women to organize a public protest in 1946, 
a protest that helped to inspire the foundation of the Sudanese Women's Union, 
an important feminist and women's advocacy organization, in 1952.
65 Third and 
finally, such stories confirmed among some Muslim thinkers the belief that Brit-
ish colonial rule allowed and therefore abetted Christian missionary efforts to 
evangelize among Muslims.66 
Here is where the discussion of "colonial crusades" arises again. Colonial pol-
icies and missionary activities sometimes stimulated Muslim resistance, with the 
case of female genital cutting, and missionary- and government-supported ef-
forts to eradicate it, offering a good example. Beginning in the late 1920s, British 
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authorities had funded the establishment of a midwifery training college in 
Omdurman under the leadership of two British sisters, Mabel and Gertrude Wolff. 
These two women taught hygienic techniques and encouraged the modification of 
an operation of genital cutting that was almost universally practiced among 
northern Sudanese Muslim women at the time. This operation (sometimes called 
"infibulation" in English) entailed excision of the clitoris and labia and restriction 
of the vaginal opening, and it required surgical intervention at childbirth. 67 
In 1946, the Anglo-Egyptian government, urged on by the wife of the British 
governor-general, declared a ban on the operation of infibulation, known in Ara-
bic as "Pharaonic circumcision" (al-khitan al-fzr'awni).68 Muslim leaders, such as 
Mahmud Muhammad Taha (who went on to found the organization known as the 
Republican Brothers), organized an antigovernment rally to protest this ban on 
an accepted practice. His resistance, which appears to have enjoyed considerable 
popular support, landed him in prison.69 Yet it is worth noting that prominent 
Muslim scholars and leaders at the time issued opinions or published statements 
supporting the ban and calling for the reform of female genital cutting as it was 
usually practiced. In a newspaper statement, for example, Sayyid 'Abd al-Rahman 
al-Mahdi declared that "Pharaonic circumcision is a shame and a degradation to 
women apart from being contrary to the authenticated sunna [practice of the 
Prophet Muhammad]." The mufti of Sudan published a statement that went fur-
ther, suggesting that even the custom of clitoridectomy had dubious Islamic 
grounds.70 Were Muslim leaders like these pressured by Britons into supporting 
the ban, did they support the ban to curry British favor, or did they genuinely 
believe in its aims as they related to the pursuit of Islamic practice? Historians 
should not discount the possibility that these prominent Muslim critics of female 
genital cutting genuinely supported the ban, since Sudan has furnished ample 
evidence in its modern history to indicate the diversity of Muslim opinion. 
The Lingering Discourse of Jihads and Crusades 
When the conflict that later became known as the first civil war erupted with a 
military mutiny at Torit in southern Sudan in 1955, northern Sudanese politi-
cians in Khartoum looked upon missionaries as enemies who had undermined 
national cohesion by propagating Christianity among southern "pagans." Thus, in 
1957, the Khartoum government began to nationalize mission schools, and in 
1964, it deported all foreign missionaries. A government memorandum issued at 
the time described missionaries as an obstacle to national integration and accused 
them of sheltering, supplying, or otherwise abetting southern "mutineers" and 
"outlaws."71 These measures forced the rapid indigenization of southern Sudanese 
church leadership and confirmed the assumption among political analysts that 
Muslim-Christian conflict would either become or remain a perennial theme in 
modern Sudanese history. 
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This first civil war abated in 1972, with the signing of the Addis Ababa 
Agreement, but it flared up again, more intensely, after 1983, when President 
Ja'far Numayri proclaimed shari'a law. During the second civil war, as the post-
1983 conflict became known, Muslim ideology played an important role in the 
central government's discourses. To rally popular support and justify military 
drafts among northern Muslims, Khartoum regimes portrayed the civil war as a 
jihad and proclaimed that its war dead were martyrs. By the mid-1990s, the gov-
ernment had set up large murals of "martyrs" along major streets in the capital 
and was inculcating militant Islam even in girls' elementary schools, where uni-
forms were made out of camouflage fabric. 72 
After 1983, Khartoum politicians found jihad to be politically expedient in 
other ways, too. Jihadist rhetoric enabled the regime to draw more support from 
other Muslim states, such as Saudi Arabia, which helped the government with its 
Islamization programs by offering money to construct mosques and Islamic 
schools in remote and largely non-Muslim regions.73 More generally, northern 
politicians gave lip service to shari'a law and Islamic values as a way of appealing 
to Muslim populations who were otherwise disillusioned with the corruption, 
mismanagement, and factional infighting of successive postcolonial regimes.
7
·
1 
After its rise to power in the coup of 1989, the Bashir regime proved willing to 
invoke jihad for internal wars, not only against assumed non-Muslims in the 
south (where many Muslim families also lived, particularly in towns) but also 
against Muslims elsewhere. The latter proved true in 1992, when government 
forces bombed dissident Muslim communities in the Nuba Mountains of Kordo-
fan and apparently sold thousands of survivors as slaves to the Arab tribal militias 
that backed the regime. According to French analyst Gerard Prunier, the Bashir 
regime's readiness to invoke jihad against Nuba Muslims presaged policies that it 
would later pursue in Darfur following the outbreak of war there in 2003.
75 
By emphasizing the religious dimensions of civil conflicts, the Sudanese gov-
ernment tried to distract attention from the deep economic and political griev-
ances that had been propelling these wars from the start. Many southerners, along 
with other non-Arab Sudanese peoples (including Muslims from Darfur, the Nuba 
Mountains, and the Red Sea Hills region), resented the way Arabic-speaking Mus-
lims of the northern riverine Sudan had monopolized power and resources. They 
were disgusted, in other words, with a history of underdevelopment and neglect in 
the country's peripheries (a history that went back to the Anglo-Egyptian pe-
riod).76 By 1983, many southerners opposed the regime's Jonglei Canal project, 
which proposed to drain the south's White Nile tributaries in order to feed the 
main Nile going into northern Sudan and Egypt. They feared the local environ-
mental consequences that the canal would have. Demand for Nile water, spurred 
by the development of agricultural industries and the Aswan Dam's hydroelectric 
power plant, was growing, so that "hydropolitics" functioned as an important 
issue for Sudanese-Egyptian diplomacy.77 Much the same later applied to "pet-
ropolitics," which centered on the oil that the Khartoum government began to 
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extract from the southern Sudan (with help from Chinese, Malaysian, Canadian, 
and other companies) in 1999. On top of this environmental and economic exploi-
tation, the regime's attempts to foist Arabic and Islamic culture onto non-Arabs or 
non-Muslims amounted to what some dissidents described as a new, internal 
colonialism. 78 
After 1983, the Sudan People's Liberation Army and Movement (SPLA/M), 
which was the main southern opposition force, called for secular government and 
official recognition of Sudanese pluralism. The SPLA/M, which spread its organi-
zation into the Nuba Mountains and included both Muslim and Christian sup-
porters (including Nuba Muslim commanders such as Yousif Kuwa Mekki)/9 did 
not resort to crusader discourses even though Christianity was becoming increas-
ingly influential as a cultural force among much of its rank and file. 80 Amid war 
and displacement, international Christian organizations claimed to detect the 
rapid expansion of Christianity among refugees and even among soldiers, citing, 
for example, a sharp rise in the number of SPLA Christian chaplains by 2000.81 
One anthropologist ascribed the dramatic spread of Christianity to two things: 
first, Christianity helped southern Sudanese to overcome ethnic divisions, which 
had led to intense internecine fighting; and second, it offered them a "sturdy ideo-
logical opponent" against the official Islam of the Khartoum regimes.82 Yet the 
SPLNM retained both Muslim and Christian supporters, and this internal diver-
sity reinforced the movement's commitment to cultural pluralism. 
The so-called second civil war was brutal. In 1998, some fifteen years after this 
bout of war had begun, the U.S. Committee for Refugees was estimating that some 
2 million southern Sudanese people had died from war-related causes and more 
than 80 percent of the southern population had experienced displacement.83 How-
ever, this second civil war appeared to end in 2005, when the government of Sudan 
(representing the Bashir regime in Khartoum) and the SPLM (representing south-
ern interests) met in Naivasha, Kenya, to sign a Comprehensive Peace Agreement 
(CPA). After so many years of strife, southern Sudanese people-both in Sudan 
and in the diaspora-drew hope from the CPA's claim that following a transitional 
period of government partnership, southerners would have the chance to vote in 
a referendum on national unity in 2011. 
In 2003, a new Sudanese civil war broke out in the western Sudanese region of 
Darfur, pitting "rebels" and settled civilian populations on the one hand against 
government forces and nomadic Arab militias on the other. By 2005, at the peak of 
the violence against Darfurian civilians, some analysts were suggesting that the 
westward shift of war toward Darfur was no accident, insofar as the Khartoum 
regime was using war as a machine for survival in the aftermath of signing the CPA 
with southerners. Regardless, the war in Darfur illustrated that peace for southern 
Sudan was and could only be a partial resolution of Sudan's civil conflicts, since 
popular grievances extended into the Muslim-majority regions of the country's 
eastern and western peripheries. The Darfur war also illustrated the limits of using 
religion-and in this case, the ostensible Islamic ideology of the Bashir regime-as 
Jihads and Crusades in Sudan from 1881 to the Present 277 
an explanatory device for political behavior. Indeed, Sudanese and non-Sudanese 
analysts alike agreed with reference to the Darfur war that notions of race and 
ethnicity (involving Arab rather than Islamic ideology) were intensifying and com-
plicating the conflict.8·1 
Conclusion 
In 1974, the Sudanese folklorist Qurashi Muhammad Hasan argued that praise 
poetry-which he called the "jihad of the pen" -had been more important to the 
success of the Mahdist revolution than the "jihad of the sword" involving soldiers 
in combat. Yet historians of Sudan have remembered the "sword fights" more 
than the "pen fights," by emphasizing the importance of battles such as the "Fall 
of Khartoum" in 1885, the Battle of Karari (Omdurman) in 1898, or the Torit 
Mutiny in 1955 (the event that by many accounts set off the "first" Sudanese civil 
war). Fewer have examined the discursive evidence of conflict, found in proclama-
tions, panegyrics, memoranda, personal letters, memoirs, newspaper articles-
the list goes on and on. Such discursive evidence can tell us how, amid the claims 
for jihads and crusades, Muslims and Christians in Sudan have mobilized sup-
porters, attacked opponents, and justified proposals for change, even while 
defining themselves. 
Fulfilling provisions that the CPA of 2005 had set out, southern Sudanese 
people had the opportunity to vote in a referendum on national unity that oc-
curred in January 2011. The referendum yielded clear and dramatic results: nearly 
99 percent supported southern secession. Secession occurred in July 2011, and a 
new country, the Republic of South Sudan, was born. With South Sudan now a 
state apart from Sudan, possible conflicts still loom large, conflicts involving nat-
ural resources (oil and water) and the treatment of religious minorities (Chris-
tians in Sudan and Muslims in South Sudan). However-to a degree much greater 
than in earlier periods of Sudanese history-external powers are likely to inter-
vene in these disputes for the sake of advancing their own diverse interests. These 
external powers will include Egypt, China, the United States, Saudi Arabia, Kenya, 
and Uganda.85 As this chapter's study of Sudanese history suggests, for better or 
worse, jihadist or crusader discourses may well continue to provide a vehicle and 
a flexible vocabulary for advancing agendas, claims to power, and calls for change. 
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